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ARTICLE
A PRECAUTIONARY TALE: ASSESSING
ECOLOGICAL DAMAGES AFTER THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
SANNE KNUDSEN*
INTRODUCTION
To some, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez is an old story: An Exxon
supertanker runs aground Bligh Reef in the dead of night on March 24,
1989. Eleven million gallons of crude oil are released into one of the most
delicate and spectacular marine ecosystems on the planet.1 The resulting oil
slick stretches 500 miles—the coastline equivalent of Massachusetts to
North Carolina—and adversely impacts 1,300 miles of shoreline.2 Ten
thousand workers and about $2.1 billion are dedicated to cleanup efforts.3
The livelihood of over 34,000 fishermen is jeopardized, forcing some to
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of
Utah.
1. EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 STATUS REPORT 4 (2009), available
at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/20th%20Anniversary%20Re-
port/2009%20Status%20Report%20(Low-Res).pdf [hereinafter TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 REPORT];
see also Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Questions and Answers, http://www.evostc.state.
ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Trustee Council, Questions].
2. Trustee Council, Questions, supra note 1; see also Evelyn D. Brown, Brenda L. Norcross
& Jeffrey W. Short, An Introduction to Studies of the Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on
Early Life History Stages of Pacific Herring, Clupea Pallasi, in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 53
CAN. J. FISH & AQUATIC SCI. 2337, 2338 (1996) (noting that an estimated 40–45 percent of the oil
spilled became beached within Prince William Sound).
3. Trustee Council, Questions, supra note 1; see also TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 REPORT,
supra note 1, at 5 (noting that “[a]t one point more than 11,000 people were working on
cleanup”).
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change careers or relocate over time.4 The social fabric of native communi-
ties unravels.5
Though the story of the grounding, litigation, devastation, and cleanup
has been finding its way into the news media for over two decades, the
story is not complete.6 Humbling as it is, our understanding of the ecologi-
cal damages that have resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill is still
unfolding.7
Twenty years after the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, the
Exxon Valdez Trustee Council8 continues to identify two species as “not
recovered”—meaning that the species show little or no signs of improve-
ment. One of those species is the Pacific herring.9 As a keystone species,
herring is central to the marine food web at all of its life stages. In fact,
herring is so significant to the Prince William Sound ecosystem that the
4. Wesley Loy, Decision Torments Cordova Fishermen, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June
26, 2008 (discussing impacts of spill to Cordova fishermen, forcing some to enter hotel industry);
Byron Pitts, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 20 Years Later, CBS EVENING NEWS, Feb. 2, 2009, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/02/eveningnews/main4769329.shtml (noting that 8,000 plain-
tiffs have liens on their settlements); Town Braces for High Court Oil Spill Hearing, USA TODAY,
Feb. 25, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/environment/2008-02-5-exxon-hear-
ing_N.htm (describing stories of devastation among some fishermen).
5. For detailed research and discussions about the cultural and psychological impacts of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on Native Alaskan communities, see Duane A. Gill & J. Steven Picou,
THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READING ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM 167–87 (J. Steven
Picou et al. eds., 1997); Duane A. Gill & J. Steven Picou, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL AND
CHRONIC PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS, IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL SYMPOSIUM
879 (Stanley D. Rice et al. eds., 1996).
6. More than twenty years after the spill, some species have yet to recover. TRUSTEE COUN-
CIL, 2009 REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. Ecological impacts are still being discovered. Id. at 10.
Damage disputes remain unresolved. Infra note 137 (noting that Exxon has yet to respond to the
federal government’s demand for an additional $92 million under the reopener provision of the
natural resource damages settlement).
7. Recent research has shown that lingering oil persists in the Prince William Sound envi-
ronment at toxicity levels almost as high as a few weeks after the spill. See TRUSTEE COUNCIL,
2009 REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; Oil Plagues Sound 20 Years After Exxon Valdez, msnbc.com,
June 4, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29838444; Bryan Walsh, Still Digging Up Exxon
Valdez Oil, 20 Years Later, TIME, June 4, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1902333,00.html. In fact, “The amount of Exxon Valdez oil remaining substantially ex-
ceeds the sum total of all previous oil pollution on beaches in Prince William Sound, including oil
spilled during the 1964 earthquake.” TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. Be-
cause of lingering oil, some species such as the sea otter continue to be exposed to the toxic oil.
Id. at 12–13. In addition to lingering oil, slower than expected recovery and evidence of unusual
social breakdown within one resident orca whale population has caught the attention of research-
ers. Id. at 14–15.
8. The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council was formed to oversee the restoration of the injured
Prince William Sound ecosystem. The Trustee Council administers the $900 million natural re-
source damages settlement; it consists of three state and three federal trustees. The Council is also
advised by members of the public and by members of the scientific community. TRUSTEE COUN-
CIL, 2009 REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
9. The other species to share the unenviable title of “not recovering” is the Pigeon Guille-
mot. Id. at 16.
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Trustee Council has said it will not deem the Sound’s ecosystem recovered
unless and until herring abundance has been restored.10
As significant as the herring is to the marine food web, relatively little
is known about the particular biological mechanisms that caused this fish-
ery to collapse in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The circumstantial
evidence connecting the fishery collapse and the Exxon spill, however, is
compelling. Before the Exxon spill, the herring population was increasing
and commercial fishermen were reporting record harvests.11 In 1993, just
four years after the spill, the herring population crashed. That year, only 25
percent of the expected adults returned to spawn.12 Since then, the Prince
William Sound herring fishery has been closed for fifteen of the last twenty
years, including every year since 1999.13 By contrast, in other areas of
Alaska that were not hit by the Exxon Valdez oil slick (e.g., Sitka), herring
populations have not shown abnormal patterns of decline over the last two
decades.14
After the spill, Exxon was subject to the full litany of civil and crimi-
nal fines, penalties, civil litigation, and natural resource damage awards.
For instance, as part of the natural resource damage assessment process,
Exxon paid $900 million over ten years to the federal and state govern-
ments for restoration efforts.15 In addition, Exxon paid plaintiffs in the Ex-
xon Valdez oil spill litigation an estimated $287 million in compensatory
damages under the Phase II jury award.16 Eventually, after several trips to
10. EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, INTEGRATED HERRING RESTORATION PRO-
GRAM, DRAFT OUTLINE 3 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/
Documents/Publications/IHRP%20-%20Draft%209-3-08.pdf (stating that “[H]erring are an inte-
gral part of every inshore ecosystem on the northwest coast of North America and we cannot
consider the Prince William Sound ecosystem recovered from the effects of the oil spill until
herring abundance has been restored.”) [hereinafter TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM].
11. EVELYN D. BROWN & MARK G. CARLS, EXXON VALDEZ Oil Spill Trustee Council RES-
TORATION NOTEBOOK: PACIFIC HERRING (Clupea Pallasi) 3 (Sept. 1998) [hereinafter TRUSTEE
COUNCIL, PACIFIC HERRING].
12. Id.; see also TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 3.
13. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 3.
14. See Brief for Jean-Michael Cousteau and Other Natural and Social Scientists as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No.
07-219) (“[A]lthough herring populations up to 1989 had been at record highs, and have remained
high in other areas of the North Pacific and Gulf of Alaska like unoiled Sitka Sound, herring
populations in the oiled areas have remained extremely low ever since 1993.”).
15. See Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., Nos. A91-082 &
A91-083 (D. Alaska Oct. 19, 1991), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Docu-
ments/History/Agree_CD.pdf; Plaintiff Government’s Memorandum in Support of Consent De-
cree, United States v. Exxon Corp., Nos. A91-082 & A91-083 (D. Alaska Oct. 8, 1991), available
at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/History/GovMemo.pdf. See generally Wil-
liam H. Rodgers et al., The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Settlements and
Roads Not Taken, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 135 (2005) (providing additional background on the settle-
ment process).
16. Civil cases filed against Exxon were eventually consolidated into a single action before
Judge Russell Holland in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Plaintiffs
included commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners. Plaintiffs were divided into
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the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld a $507.5 million punitive
damage award.17
Despite the total collapse of the Pacific herring population in Prince
William Sound, and despite the full suite of legal remedies lodged against
Exxon in the wake of the spill, no meaningful damages were recovered for
the disappearance of this critical marine species. The time delay between
the spill and the herring fishery collapse in 1993 meant that the jury’s award
of compensatory damages in 1994 was largely based on the closure of the
herring fishery in 1989. Compensation for what would later be revealed as a
total collapse of a keystone species was therefore limited to $15.8 million
for injury to herring in 1989, and $7 million for 1993.18 In addition, because
the natural resource damage settlement was complete in 1991, the herring
population crash was not factored into those damages either. This means
that there has been no redress to the fishermen for sustained ecological or
economic damage. Any opportunities for such redress based on evolving
scientific understanding regarding the relationship between the Exxon spill
and the herring fishery collapse is foreclosed.
The story of the Pacific herring in Prince William Sound is illustrative
of a broader disconnect between the dynamic, complex, and uncertain na-
ture of ecological injuries on the one hand, and our existing damages para-
digm—which requires relatively quick and static opportunities for
identification and valuation—on the other hand. Through the herring’s
story, this article examines the nature of ecological injuries and the short-
comings of our existing damages paradigm for assessing those unique
damages.
To address the shortcomings of our existing damages paradigm, this
article suggests that we invoke the burden-shifting attributes of the precau-
tionary principle19 to transfer the risk of long-term, unknown ecological
harm to those who have caused the injury. Through such a risk transfer, this
article posits that true costs of ecological injury would more properly be
borne by actors capable of altering their behavior to avoid such injury in the
first place. In addition, this article suggests offering defendants two options
three separate classes for the compensatory damages phase of the trial, but consolidated into a
single, mandatory class for the punitive phase. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2613–14.
17. Id. at 2634 (vacating $2.5 billion award and upholding $507.5 million); see also Baker v.
Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Exxon Valdez), 472 F.3d 600, 625 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacating $4.5 billion
punitive damage award and remitting to $2.5 billion); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215,
1246–47 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating $5 billion punitive damages award and remanding to district for
consideration in light of BMW and Cooper Industries).
18. See In re Exxon Valdez Litigation, Phase II Jury Verdict (D. Alaska 1994) (on file with
author).
19. The precautionary principle generally advocates regulatory action in response to evidence
of health and environmental risk, even before harm is manifested or the degree of risk is fully
known. See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2003). The precautionary principle often entails shifting the burden
of proof to proponents of inaction or those who might harm the environment. Id.
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for incurring damages for ecological injuries—either accepting a multiplier
of the compensatory damage award or paying for later-discovered damages
on an ongoing basis through a case-specific superfund. These options are
aimed at embodying the total cost of ecological injuries.
Section I of this article describes how the uncertainty and complexity
underlying the Pacific herring fishery collapse is characteristic of the
unique nature of ecological injuries. Section II examines why our existing
damage assessment mechanisms—compensatory damages, punitive dam-
ages, and natural resource damages—are insufficient for capturing the ex-
tent and duration of ecological harms. Section III examines the history of
the precautionary principle, considers the application of that principle in the
European Union (EU) and U.S. environmental law, and argues that we
should invoke the precautionary principle to create a new framework for
assessing damages for ecological harms.
SECTION I – THE NATURE OF ECOLOGICAL INJURY AND THE STORY OF
THE PACIFIC HERRING FISHERY
A. Uniqueness of Ecological Injuries
Environmental law scholar Richard J. Lazarus has posited that envi-
ronmental protection laws have five defining characteristics—complexity,
scientific uncertainty, dynamism, precaution, and controversy.20 These
characteristics are reflections of the nature of ecological injuries them-
selves.21 Because of their nature, ecological injuries give rise to difficult
problems in identifying the extent and duration of harm; proving causal
relationships between manifested harm and the allegedly environmentally
detrimental act; and providing such identification and proof within the time
frame usually required from response plans and redress paradigms.
To most lay people, and certainly to those trained in the field of biol-
ogy or ecology, it is no secret that the ecological systems forming the world
around us are complex and dynamic.22 After all, ecosystems are living sys-
tems that, like the human body, are made up of a series of intricately-woven
parts with multiple positive and negative feedback loops. “Even relatively
simple ecological systems contain hundreds of different species, each with
their own range of susceptibilities to chemicals or other adverse agents or
conditions. Moreover, ecological systems are not just a sum of the individ-
20. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16 (2004).
21. Id.
22. For a discussion of the complex, dynamic, and uncertain attributes of the environment
that, in turn, impact environmental laws, see id. at 16–24. See also Annecoos Wiersema, A Train
Without Tracks: Rethinking The Place of Law and Goals In Environmental and Natural Resources
Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1246–48 (2008); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Gov-
ernance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 194–97 (2001).
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ual organisms, but have both structural and functional relationships critical
to a healthy ecosystem.”23
Positive and negative response mechanisms duly complicate our un-
derstanding of ecosystem dynamics by either amplifying or diminishing the
intensity of adverse impacts.24 There are numerous examples of such mech-
anisms in the area of climate science. For example, as rising concentrations
of greenhouse gases warm Earth’s climate, snow and ice begin to melt. This
melting reveals darker land and water surfaces that were beneath the snow
and ice; these darker surfaces absorb more of the sun’s heat, causing more
warming, which causes more melting, and so on, in a self-reinforcing cycle.
This feedback loop, known as the “ice-albedo feedback,” amplifies the ini-
tial warming caused by rising levels of greenhouse gases.25
In addition, because of the interconnectedness of natural systems,
chemicals released into one media will not necessarily manifest their great-
est harm in that same media, or in the same location for that matter.26 Detri-
mental impacts of acid rain are a good example of this problem. For
instance, coal-fired power plants emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides
into the atmosphere.27 Prevailing winds blow these compounds across state
and national borders, sometimes over hundreds of miles.28 If these com-
pounds are blown into areas where the weather is wet, the acids reacts in the
atmosphere with water, oxygen, and other chemicals to form various acidic
compounds that fall to the ground in the form of rain or snow.29 As the
acidic water flows over and through the ground, it affects a variety of plants
and animals.30 A compound that began as an air emission in Illinois can
23. Joanna Burger, Methods for and Approaches to Evaluating Susceptibility of Ecological
Systems to Hazardous Chemicals, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. (Supp. 4) 843, 844 (1997).
24. LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 19–21.
25. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSI-
CAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
97 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT]. The effect of cloud cover on
climate impacts provides another good example of how these mechanisms complicate our under-
standing of causal relationships in our global ecosystem. To that end, clouds can amplify global
warming by absorbing infrared radiation and thereby exert a greenhouse effect. “A change in
almost any aspect of clouds, such as their type, location, water content, cloud altitude, particle size
and shape, or lifetimes, affects the degree to which clouds warm or cool the Earth. Some changes
amplify warming while others diminish it.” Id. at 116. Detecting, understanding, and accurately
quantifying climate feedbacks have been the focus of a great deal of research by scientists unrav-
eling the complexities of Earth’s climate: “Much research is in progress to better understand how
clouds change in response to climate warming, and how these changes affect climate through
various feedback mechanisms.” Id.
26. For discussion of how large spatial and temporal dimensions associated with ecological
injuries increase the scientific uncertainty in determining the extent of impacts, see LAZARUS,
supra note 20, at 19–21.
27. See NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, REPORT TO CONGRESS: AN
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 1–3 (2005).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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find its way into the lakes and streams of the Appalachian Mountains and
reap detrimental effects on aquatic life.31
Not only do ecological impacts transcend media and space, but indi-
vidual ecosystem characteristics and the weather patterns at the time of a
release will also impact the degree of ecological harm. For example, the
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, had an even worse
effect on that marine ecosystem than did the Sea Empress spill between
England and Wales, largely because in the former there is little water move-
ment, and the oil remained within Prince William Sound for a longer period
of time without dispersing to the ocean where it could be weathered or
diluted.32
Given the complexity that characterizes ecosystems, predicting the de-
gree of harm that will be caused by an environmental disaster is difficult
and transformations to one aspect of an ecosystem often result in unfore-
seen effects. For example, in the 1960s, public health workers in Borneo
sought to control mosquito-borne malaria by spraying village huts with the
insecticide DDT. This action set off a chain of events that actually ended up
increasing disease in the villages. The chain of reactions went like this:
After eating DDT-contaminated food, the local lizard population was dev-
astated. This collapse caused a decrease in the local cat population that re-
lied on the lizards for a primary source of food. The scarcity of cats led to a
population explosion of caterpillars and rats. The caterpillars in turn de-
stroyed the thatched roofs and the rats caused increased disease in the
villages.33
Owing in large part to the complex and dynamic interrelationships that
characterize ecosystems, there is a corresponding high level of scientific
uncertainty when biologists, ecologists, or other scientists are charged with
the task of proving causal relationships or otherwise answering the ever
illusive question—why? Providing answers to these questions is made even
more difficult given that ecological injuries can occur over long periods of
time, sometimes spanning decades or generations. The longer period of
time, the greater the number of intervening events, and thus the greater the
difficulty in unraveling the cause and effect. This time delay between an
ecological disturbance and consequent adverse impacts gives rise to one of
the more fundamental, controversial, and complicated questions in environ-
mental law—what level of scientific certainty is enough to compel action or
warrant redress?
As Lazarus observes: “When scientists are compelled to give scientific
‘answers’ within time constraints under which no such answer based in sci-
ence is possible, they are no longer strictly acting purely as scientists—or at
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 11.
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least they are not acting consistently with the norms of their scientific disci-
plines.”34 In other words, science—especially when called upon to answer
questions of ecological harm—is not the realm of the perfectly explainable
or the perfectly predictable. Science can provide some answers, but those
answers are not necessarily complete or available at the time that those
answers are desired. Choosing to act based on imperfect information is,
therefore, a policy issue—a value judgment.35
The collapse of the Pacific herring fishery in the wake of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill is a good illustration of the uncertainty and complexity that
plagues our understanding of ecological injuries. In particular, the story of
the Pacific herring illustrates how the defining characteristics of ecological
injuries create difficulties in (1) ascertaining the precise scientific mecha-
nisms for the damage caused and (2) predicting the long term extent and
duration of these injuries. Ultimately, like other ecological injuries, the
story of the Pacific herring raises the question of whether we should err on
the side of precaution in redressing injuries of this nature.
B. The Story of the Pacific Herring
  Before the Exxon spill, the herring population in Prince William Sound
was increasing, with record harvests reported just before the grounding.36 In
fact, in 1989, the biomass of spawning adult herring was estimated at
113,200 metric tons, the largest estimate on record.37 By 1993, four years
after the Exxon spill, the herring population crashed with only 25 percent of
the expected adults returning to spawn.38 This meant that the 1989 year
class was one of the smallest cohorts of spawning adults recorded.39 Since
then, the Prince William Sound fishery has been closed for fifteen of the
last twenty years. It was closed from 1993 to 1996; reopened in 1997 and
34. Id. at 21; see also Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the United States:
The Case for Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation’s Biological Wealth, 10
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 180 (1992) (explaining that a biologist “may spend years studying the
complex interactions of one or more species within an ecosystem and never quite understand how
the system functions as a whole. Unfortunately, actions must be taken in the absence of full
knowledge and scientific certainty in order to protect the diverse array of species that are essential
to the health of the planet.”); Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Man-
agement, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 877–78 (1997) (“The science of environmental law is difficult
and demanding. Reasonable differences and controversies rage over safe air and water quality
levels, the effects of pollutant discharges, and tolerance levels for carcinogens, mutagens, and
reproductive toxins.”).
35. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8–12 (2004) (offering a “broader and more integrative
perspective” on decisions impacting health and the environment rather than the formulaic, cost-
benefit approach and urging “precaution in the face of scientific uncertainty and fairness in the
treatment of current and future generations”).
36. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 3.
37. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, PACIFIC HERRING, supra note 11, at 3.
38. Id.
39. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, PACIFIC HERRING, supra note 11, at 4.
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1998 based on increasing populations; closed again in 1999 due to declining
numbers; and has remained closed ever since.40
To understand the impacts of the Exxon spill on the herring population
in Prince William Sound, one has to understand a little about basic ecology,
herring biology, and the timing of the spill relative to herring life stages and
behavior.
At all life stages, herring are central to the marine food web.41 As a
forage fish, herring provides a critical biological link between species
within the ecosystem.42 It connects the production of algae and zooplankton
to large predators including humpback whales, harbor seals, a large variety
of marine and shore birds, bald eagles, jellyfish, other invertebrates, and
other fish such as pollock.43 The reason that herring is such an important
link between species is because herring is rich in natural oils containing
significant amounts of energy. Through the uptake of herring, the oceanic
ecosystem transfers energy between species.44 The recovery of the Prince
William Sound ecosystem post-Exxon, therefore, is tied to the recovery of
the herring.45 For example, “seabirds will have difficulty recovering with-
out the recovery of herring, which is a vital food source.”46
The Pacific herring undergoes four life stages—eggs, larvae, juveniles,
and adults.47 All of these stages are found in the Prince William Sound in
various seasons and locations. Spawning in Prince William Sound takes
place mainly in April, lasting anywhere from five days to three weeks.48
Herring spawn along the same beaches every year.49 During spawning, the
eggs attach to eelgrass, rockweed, and kelp in shallow subtidal and inter-
tidal areas.50 After the eggs hatch (in about May), the larvae migrate to the
surface, congregate nearshore, and continue to grow.51 The larvae are poor
swimmers and their distribution is therefore primarily affected by the cur-
40. Trustee Council, Questions, supra note 1, at 35; see also TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORA-
TION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 3.
41. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 1. In addition to their ecological importance, her-
ring—namely their eggs—are the foundation of a “multi-million dollar resource that is available
to commercial fishers in the spring, before the main salmon seasons open.” Id. In the early 1900s,
herring were dry salted for Asian markets. Id. at 3. Until the mid 1960s, herring were sold for fish
meal and oil in domestic and international markets. Id. Since then, “they have been harvested for
their roe and spawn-on-kelp . . . , food . . . , and bait.” Id.
42. Trustee Council, Questions, supra note 1, at 16.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 3 (Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Trustee Council noting that “we cannot consider the Prince William Sound ecosystem recovered
from the effects of the oil spill until herring abundance has been restored”).
46. Trustee Council, Questions, supra note 1, at 15.
47. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 6.
48. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 2.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 6.
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rents. For the first year or two, nearshore habitats remain important for
juveniles.52 Juveniles then join the adult population in deeper waters. In
Prince William Sound, adult Pacific herring rarely spawn before their third
year, and the average life span is about nine years.53 “After spawning in the
spring, adult Pacific herring disperse from the spawning aggregations to
multiple schools in deeper waters.”54
As luck would have it, adult herring and their offspring are most vul-
nerable to predation, weather patterns, ocean conditions, and human activi-
ties during the spring—right when the Exxon Valdez ran aground.55 At the
same time that 11 million gallons of crude oil were washing up on the
beaches and forming a five-hundred-mile oil slick, herring were gathering
in the oily nearshore areas of Prince William Sound to spawn. Indeed, “the
spill trajectory overlapped the route of adult herring spawning migration
and spawning locations, thus creating a significant risk of exposure to
adults and eggs.”56
Because of the timing of the spill and spawning, an estimated 40–50
percent of the egg biomass in 1989 was exposed to oil during early develop-
ment.57 In addition, nearly half of the oil that was spilled became beached
within Prince William Sound, which is where herring spawn and where
juveniles spend the first year or two of their development.58 Together this
created a significant risk of oil exposure to adults and eggs. Unfortunately,
but not surprisingly, herring are most sensitive to the toxic effects of oil
during the early life stages.59
The short-term economic damages from the Exxon Valdez oil spill
were relatively easy to characterize—“all herring fisheries were closed in
1989 to eliminate the risk of contaminated catches.”60 Similarly, some
short-term ecological injuries were discovered through early scientific stud-
ies conducted from 1989 to 1991. Those studies concluded that there were
substantial sublethal effects in newly hatched larvae including premature
hatching, low larval weights, reduced growth, and increased morphologic
and genetic abnormalities.61 There was also reduced survival from hatch to
52. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 2.
53. TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RESTORATION PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 6.
54. Id.
55. Brown, Norcross, and Short, supra note 2, at 2337; Evelyn D. Brown et al., Injury to the
Early Life History Stages of Pacific Herring in Prince William Sound After the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Symposium, supra note 5, at 448, 448.
56. Brown, Norcross & Short, supra note 2, at 2337–38; Brown et al., supra note 55, at
448–49.
57. Brown et al., supra note 55, at 457–58; BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 4.
58. Brown, Norcross & Short, supra note 2, at 2338 (noting that an estimated 40–45 percent
of the oil spilled became beached within Prince William Sound).
59. Brown et al., supra note 55, at 449; Brown, Norcross & Short, supra note 2, at 2337.
60. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 4.
61. Brown et al., supra note 55, at 458; BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 5 (summarizing
results of early studies); see also Richard M. Kocan, Jo Ellen Hose, Evelyn D. Brown & Timothy
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free swimming. In particular, egg and larval mortality was twice as great in
oiled areas as nonoiled areas.62 Additionally, juveniles were exposed to oil
from the ingestion of copepods, a major food source for young herrings,
which accumulate and concentrate petroleum hydrocarbons in their bod-
ies.63 Adult herring were also exposed to spilled oil; individuals sampled
immediately after the spill at oil sites had liver lesions.64 To be sure, herring
were significantly exposed to the toxic oil at all of their life stages—eggs,
larvae, juvenile, and adult.65
The degree of oil exposure to the herring and the known short-term
impacts of exposure would logically suggest that the Exxon oil spill in some
way caused the herring fishery collapse.66 In fact, the timing of the early
life stages of the herring means that embryos and larvae present in the inter-
tidal area at the time of the spill were exposed to petroleum hydrocarbons
and “would be entering the breeding population in 1993 for the first time as
4 year olds.”67 In other words, the herring population crashed in Prince
William Sound precisely when the eggs and larvae exposed to oil in 1989
should have been returning to spawn for the first time.
The science connecting the 1989 spill to the 1993 collapse has not
been as forthcoming as one might expect.68 Much of the scientific uncer-
T. Baker, Pacific Herring (Clupea pallasi) Embryo Sensitivity to Prudhoe Bay Petroleum Hydro-
carbons: Laboratory Evaluation and In Situ Exposure at Oiled and Unoiled Sites in Prince Wil-
liam Sound, 53 CAN. J. FISHERIES AQUATIC SCI. 2366, 2373 (1996) (“Naturally spawned herring
eggs collected from oil sites in 1989 produced significantly more physically deformed and geneti-
cally damaged larvae than did eggs collected from unoiled sites. . . . The results of this study
demonstrate that Pacific herring embryos and larvae are adversely affected by exposure to
Prudhoe Bay crude oil and responses range from sublethal genetic damage to physical deformities
and death.”).
62. Michael D. McGurk & Evelyn D. Brown, Egg-larval Mortality of Pacific Herring in
Prince William Sound, Alaska, After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 53 CAN. J. FISHERIES AQUATIC
SCI. 2343, 2351 (1996).
63. Brown et al., supra note 55, at 449; BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 5.
64. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 4.
65. Richard E. Thorne & Gary L. Thomas, Herring and the “Exxon Valdez” Oil Spill: An
Investigation into Historical Data Conflicts, 65 INT’L COUNCIL EXPLORATION SEA J. MARINE SCI.
44, 48 (2008) (“There are also several indications that both the early and adult life history stages
were damaged by the oil spill.”).
66. While precise biological pathways and ecological mechanisms were not readily identified
to link the spill to the population decline, some scientists nonetheless acknowledged the logical
connection between the two events. See R.M. Kocan, G.D. Marty, M.S. Okihiro, E.D. Brown &
T.T. Baker, Reproductive Success and Histopathology of Individual Prince William Sound Pacific
Herring 3 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 53 CAN. J. FISHERIES AQUATICS SCI. 2388,
2392 (1996) (“It seems unlikely . . . that natural environmental conditions would be more detri-
mental to aquatic organisms than 11,000,000 gallons . . . of crude oil deposited during the peak of
their spawning season.”).
67. Kocan, Hose, Brown & Baker, supra note 61, at 2367.
68. The impact of the Exxon oil spill on herring was not the only aspect of spill impacts that
eluded scientists for many years. In fact, in describing the state of recovery twenty years after the
spill, Alaska Deputy Attorney General Craig Tillery remarks that the “long-term damage was not
expected at the time of the spill and was only just starting to be recognized in 1999, at the 10th
Anniversary.” TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. See also Brenda L. Norcross,
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tainty surrounding the herring fishery was caused by the fact that the fishery
did not collapse until four years after the oil spill. Because of this time
delay, the collapse and the oil spill were not initially thought to be linked.69
Linking the two events was particularly perplexing because there was no
known mechanism for continued oil exposure to herring after 1990.70 Be-
cause scientists assumed that harm caused by the spill would have been due
to oil exposure immediately after the spill, some believed that the toxic
impacts of oil exposure were restricted to the 1989 year class.71
It was not until 2007 that a study was published by Richard Thorne
and Gary Thomas to support the idea that the herring population in Prince
William Sound started decreasing immediately after the Exxon spill and
was the result of the spill.72 The reasons for this conclusion were at least
twofold. First, recent science suggests that adult herring break the water
surface in response to predation, which means that the exposure of adult
herring to the surficial Exxon oil was greater than originally believed.73 The
exposure of adult herring to the surface oil, therefore, could have caused an
even greater number of fish to die from mechanical suffocation.74 Second,
the study found a notable similarity between the pattern of sea lion decline
and the herring disappearance between 1989 and 1994. This pattern sug-
gested that the decline of the herring began earlier than 1993.75
The scientific uncertainty underlying the Pacific herring collapse is ex-
acerbated by the complex nature of ecological relationships. In particular,
the interplay between competition, predation, disease, and climate change
make the ability to predict the extent, nature, and duration of harm very
difficult. In the case of the herring, there are several theories as to how the
Exxon spill contributed to the population crash by exacerbating natural
pressures.
Take the liver lesions found on the adult herring, for example. While
these lesions were originally attributed to oil exposure, subsequent studies
Jo Ellen Hose, Michele Frandsen & Evelyn D. Brown, Distribution, Abundance, Morphological
Condition, and Cytogenetic Abnormalities of Larval Herring in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 53 CAN. J. FISHERIES AQUATICS SCI., 2376, 2385 (1996)
(“The long-term consequences of the observed effects to the survival of the 1989 year-class can-
not be predicted with any certainty, but the magnitude and severity of these effects have prompted
further monitoring.”).
69. Thorne & Thomas, supra note 65, at 44 (“It was generally believed that the 1989 ‘Exxon
Valdez’ oil spill did not cause the collapse of the Prince William Sound Pacific herring (Clupea
pallasi) population because of a 4-year gap between the spill and the collapse.”).
70. W.H. Pearson et al., Why Did the Prince William Sound, Alaska, Pacific Herring (Clupea
pallasi) Fisheries Collapse in 1993 and 1994? Review of Hypotheses, 56 CAN. J. FISHERIES
AQUATIC. SCI. 711, 711 (1999) (“The low level of oil exposure documented for herring in 1989
and the following years all indicate that the 1989 oil spill did not contribute to the 1993 decline.”).
71. See Thorne & Thomas, supra note 65, at 44.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 47–48.
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 46–48.
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demonstrated that exposure to the oil from the Exxon spill depressed im-
mune functions in herring and allowed expression of viral hemorrhagic sep-
ticemia (VHSV).76 This relationship could explain why herring sampled
from Prince William Sound at the time of the fishery collapse in 1993 con-
tained similar lesions even though hydrocarbon exposure was no longer de-
tectable.77 Once the population levels of herring were depressed as a result
of the VHSV and other factors, it is possible that other species have filled
some of the ecosystem niches previously occupied by herring.78 This com-
petition for habitat or food at some life stage may limit the success and
ability of herring to recover post-crash.79 Pollock, for instance, is often
found in large numbers in the same habitats as juvenile herring. Pollock
have increased in abundance and may keep herring populations at low
levels by competing for food and habitat.80
Consistent with Lazarus’s argument that ecological injuries have a dis-
tinctive and unique character, the impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on
the Pacific herring in Prince William Sound are undoubtedly complex, un-
certain, dynamic, and controversial.81 Time will tell whether the herring
collapse is irreversible, but at this point the fishery shows little sign of
recovery.
SECTION II – LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT DAMAGES FRAMEWORK IN
PROPERLY REDRESSING ECOLOGICAL HARMS
The nature of ecological injuries is, of course, only half of the problem
in redressing ecological harms. Our existing tools for remedying harm give
rise to the other half of the problem. These tools are not enough for ade-
quately remedying ecological harm. The case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
provides a good example of this disconnect. For instance, despite the full
suite of legal remedies lodged against Exxon in the wake of the spill, and
despite the total collapse of the Pacific herring population in Prince William
Sound, the only damages assessed against Exxon for the disappearance of
this keystone species were for the closure of the commercial herring fishery
in 1989 and 1993. A closer examination of the compensatory damages, pu-
nitive damages, and natural resource damages assessed in this case illustrate
the flaws in using our current tools for redressing ecological injuries.
76. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 4; Marty et al., supra note 66, at 2390.
77. BROWN & CARLS, supra note 11, at 4.
78. Id. at 5–6.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6; see also Thorne & Thomas, supra note 65, at 48.
81. The pacific herring is not the only aspect of the Exxon spill that has surprised scientists
studying the aftermath of the spill. Indeed, despite initial predictions that the oil washed up on
Prince William Sound beaches would not persist beyond ten years later, studies conducted in 2003
have revealed that in some areas the oil released from the Exxon Valdez continues to form pools in
intertidal zones at levels as toxic as the oil just a few weeks after the spill. See TRUSTEE COUNCIL,
2009 REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
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A. Compensatory Damages
After much to do in the way of claims processing, case assessment,
factual investigation, pre-trial discovery, and motions practice, the jury trial
in the Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation took place in May 1994. The case
was tried in three phases. In Phase I, the issues of liability were litigated,
including Captain Hazelwood’s intoxication and Exxon’s recklessness in
putting a known alcoholic in charge of a supertanker. Phase II assessed
compensatory damages to commercial fishermen and Alaska Natives. Fi-
nally, Phase III considered the issue of punitive damages for the entire
class.82
During Phase II, both Exxon and the fishermen plaintiffs presented
expert testimony regarding impacts to the herring fishery, but the extent of
the devastation—e.g., the total collapse of the fishery—was unknown at
this time. The time delay meant that the spill’s impacts to the ecosystem
were far greater than it was possible to discern at the time of the Exxon
Valdez trial. When the jury awarded damages in Phase II of the trial, there-
fore, they were largely based on the closure of the herring fishery in 1989.
In particular, during Phase II of the civil litigation, the jury awarded plain-
tiffs $15.8 million for injury to herring in Prince William Sound for 1989,
and $7 million for 1993.83
The compensation awarded for injury to the Pacific herring fishery
was not a failure of advocacy or science. At the time of trial, no one could
have predicted the long-term collapse. Our system, however, places the bur-
den of proving harm on the plaintiffs and requires proof in a relatively short
post-injury time frame. In addition, the current paradigm provides a one-
time chance for proving harm, with no opportunity, short of a creative set-
tlement agreement, to provide damages for injuries discovered at some later
date.
Wrapped up in the issue of timing are issues of proof and causation.
These issues stem from the unpredictability of the extent and duration of
harm. This is not only due to the fact that harms take time to manifest, but
also due to the fact that as harms manifest further out from the date of the
event, the more difficult it becomes to state with scientific certainty that
there is a direct causal connection with the event. In other words, as more
time elapses, it becomes even more difficult to explain the causal relation-
ship between the manifested injury and the event. The dynamic nature of
the environment combined with this time delay makes the identification of
harm especially difficult in a traditional damages paradigm, one that gener-
ally provides only a quick and relatively static opportunity for damage as-
82. In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d
1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001).
83. See In re Exxon Valdez Litigation, Phase II Jury Verdict (D. Alaska 1994) (on file with
author).
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sessment. The uncertainty and complexity of the injuries operate together to
make causation an easy target for defendants.
Ultimately, we need to ask whether the causal doubt generated by the
complex and uncertain attributes of ecological injury should be resolved in
favor of defendants or plaintiffs. In addition, sometimes the causal connec-
tion between an event and harm can be stated with confidence, but the pre-
cise ecological mechanisms connecting one event to the other is uncertain.
While compensatory damages are in theory intended to make plaintiffs
whole,84 there are some categories of injury for which traditional compen-
satory damages are bound to fall short of the mark. Professor Catherine
Sharkey, for instance, recognizes that compensatory damages do not cap-
ture the total cost of the injury when injuries are “concealed or difficult to
detect.”85 This category of cases is consistent with the nature of ecological
injuries, whose uncertainty and complexity make detection difficult.86
In those cases, where the injurer is more likely to escape liability, addi-
tional compensation, beyond what is provided by traditional compensatory
damages, may be necessary.87 Extra-compensatory damages are appropriate
to ensure that the injurer is internalizing the full cost of the injury. Achiev-
ing internalization of full costs stems from the economic concept of optimal
deterrence, in which deterrence results from threatening defendants with
“damages equal to the aggregate tortious loss.”88 Scholars have suggested
various means of achieving optimal deterrence through extra-compensatory
damages, such as creating a separate category of societal compensatory
damages89 or imposing a punitive damages multiplier.90 Implicit in these
proposals is the recognition that compensatory damages cannot by them-
selves ensure that the total cost of injuries will be recovered.
B. Punitive Damages
Just as compensatory damages alone are unlikely to capture the total
cost of ecological injury, neither can punitive damages be relied upon to
84. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15–16 (2d ed. 1994); see also
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-Whole Damages In Personal Injury Law:
Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117 (2003) (discussing the underlying rationale for
compensatory damages and the theory of restitution).
85. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 367
(2003).
86. See supra Section I.A for a discussion of the nature of ecological injuries.
87. Sharkey, supra note 85, at 367.
88. Id. at 364 (describing economic theory of optimal deterrence); id. at 366 (Sharkey, in-
deed, explains that to achieve deterrence, “[i]t is essential that the defendant be made to pay
damages and that they be equal to the plaintiff’s loss.”).
89. Id. at 389.
90. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“When an injurer has a chance of escaping liability, the proper
level of total damages to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused multiplied by the
reciprocal of the probability of being found liable.”).
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ensure that the cost of injury is fully realized and recovered. Indeed, while
punitive damages might have been enlisted to fulfill that role a decade ago,
due process concerns have increasingly led the United States Supreme
Court to curtail the scope of these damages.91 Even if punitive damages
could properly provide additional compensation, they are not a sufficiently
reliable mechanism for ensuring that ecological injuries are fully redressed.
At their historical root, punitive damages served the relatively narrow
purpose of punishing individual wrongs.92 Over time, punitive damages
evolved to fulfill a range of functions, both retribution and deterrence.93 To
that end, punitive damages became a mechanism for punishing both indi-
vidual and public wrongs.94 Law and economics scholars explain that puni-
tive damages fulfill deterrence functions by providing additional
compensation to ensure that full cost internalization is achieved.95 Some
states have even gone so far as recognizing that the primary purpose of
punitive damages is to compensate for costs not otherwise captured by
traditional compensatory damages.96
91. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U.S. 424 (2001); see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); but cf. Mark A.
Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2008) (argu-
ing that “vindictive damages,” such as those struck down by the Supreme Court in the wrongful
death case of Philip Morris v. Williams, can satisfy both substantive and procedural due process).
92. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392 (2008); see also Sharkey, supra note
85, at 359 (observing that “[t]he prevailing justification for punitive damages is individually ori-
ented, retributive punishment”).
93. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed
to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti-
tion.”); Colby, supra note 92, at 395 (“The purpose of punitive damages, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly told us, is to punish and deter . . . .”).
94. Colby, supra note 92, at 397 (“In the decades leading up to [Philip Morris v. Williams],
punitive damages were, with increasing frequency, awarded to punish the defendant for total harm
that its wrongful conduct caused to society, not just the harm that it caused to the actual plaintiff
or plaintiffs before the court . . . .”); Sharkey, supra note 85, at 351–52 (“[P]unitive damages have
been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence, but also to accomplish,
however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the redress of harms caused by defendants who
injure persons beyond the individual plaintiffs in a particular case.”).
95. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 897–98 (developing principles for deter-
mining cost internalization damages); Galligan, supra note 84, at 128–46 (describing the theory
and history of scholarship underlying deterrence function of punitive damages); Thomas C. Galli-
gan, Jr., The Risks of Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691, 692 (2008)
(arguing that rules for individual actions do not deter effectively in the mass tort context); Ciralo
v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calebresi, J., concurring) (arguing that
extracompensatory damages should be available to encourage cost internalization). Some law and
economics scholars even argue that the dominant goal of punitive damages should be deterrence.
See Sharkey, supra note 85, at 363 n.44 (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive”
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1989) (arguing that deterrence
is the only legitimate goal of punitive damages)).
96. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koening, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1269, 1321–22 (1993) (citing
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Perhaps because punitive damages have taken on an increasing number
of roles, the resulting size of punitive awards in some cases has attracted the
attention of the United States Supreme Court. Punitive damages have given
rise to a rich body of literature97 and numerous United States Supreme
Court decisions.98 The result of this increased attention has been an effort to
scale back the size of extravagant awards by refocusing punitive damages
on its core purposes. Indeed, after recent Supreme Court decisions in Philip
Morris v. Williams and Exxon v. Baker, the historical conception that puni-
tive damages could serve as a supplement to individual compensatory dam-
ages is “all-but-discredited.”99 In Williams, the Court clarified that punitive
damages cannot be used to compensate for harms to nonparties.100 In Ex-
xon, though technically a decision rooted in federal maritime law, the Court
reiterated that “[t]he consensus today is that punitive damages are aimed not
at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful con-
duct.”101 While there may have been a time in the history of punitive dam-
ages jurisprudence when such damages were thought to provide additional
compensation to fill gaps otherwise left by compensatory damages, that
Connecticut and Michigan as examples of jurisdictions that viewed punitive damages as serving,
at least in part, a compensatory function in the 1990s).
97. See, e.g., supra note 95 for examples of scholarship relating to the deterrence function of
punitive damages.
98. See supra note 91; see also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); cf. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 236.
99. Sharkey, supra note 85, at 390; see also Colby, supra note 92, at 400 (noting that Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), “put an end to the uncertainty” that punitive
damages might appropriately be used to compensate for harm to nonparties, e.g., for public
wrongs); see also Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Dam-
ages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 365
(2008) (suggesting that Williams rejected a traditional deterrence rationale for punitive damages,
upholding only a retributive one); Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1383, 1407 (“On account of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Philip Morris, propo-
nents of the cost internalization approach now face substantial difficulties. . . . By restricting the
permissible scope of harm for punitive damages, the Philip Morris decision now raises questions
about whether ‘total cost internalization’ is forbidden.”).
100. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 356–57 (“We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury
may not punish for the harm caused others. But we do so hold now.”); see also State Farm
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (remarking that a “defendant should
be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or
business. Due process does not permit courts, in calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant.”).
101. Exxon Shipping Co v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008); see also Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (reiterating that “punitive damages are not compensatory”). Several of
the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court on behalf of commercial fishermen in Exxon v.
Baker argued that a larger punitive damage award was justified on the basis of uncompensated
harms. One of the uncompensated harms cited in those arguments were the damages to the Pacific
herring fishery that were unknown at the time of trial. See Amicus Brief of Jean-Michel Cousteau
and Other Natural and Social Scientists, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (No. 07-219) at 3–4 (argu-
ing that “Exxon has not paid for the full impact of the destruction it has caused in the oil spill
region” and arguing that punitive damages are necessary to where the monetary value of non-
economic harm might have been difficult to detect.”); id. at 20–22 (describing long-term conse-
quences to herring that have gone uncompensated).
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time is past. Punitive damages are no longer an appropriate tool for re-
dressing uncompensated or undercompensated ecological harms.
Even if punitive damages were a viable option for addressing nonre-
tributive compensatory damages, the history of the Exxon Valdez litigation
shows that punitive damages are not a reliable tool for capturing undercom-
pensated harms.102 Fourteen years elapsed from the time the jury handed
down a $5 billion punitive damages award in 1994 to the time the Supreme
Court diminished that award to $507 million in 2008. In between, numerous
appeals and remands struggled with the appropriate level of punitive dam-
ages based on newly evolving Supreme Court decisions.
A brief overview of the history of punitive damages appeals in the
Exxon litigation might bring this point home. In 1997, Exxon first appealed
the punitive damage award to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Ninth Circuit upheld the assessment of punitive damages against Exxon but
found the award of $5 billion in punitive damages excessive in light of
BMW of North America v. Gore.103 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the BMW v. Gore guideposts.104 On remand,
Judge Holland reexamined the punitive damages award and reduced it to $4
billion.105 Exxon again appealed to the Ninth Circuit, this time arguing that
the punitive damage award was excessive in light of State Farm v. Camp-
bell.106 The Ninth Circuit again concluded that a punitive damages award of
$4 billion was not permissible under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of State Farm v.
Campbell.107 In 2004, Judge Holland reconsidered the amount of the puni-
tive damages award in Baker and increased the award to $4.5 billion.108 In
2006, after hearing the case for the punitive damages issue for the third
time, the Ninth Circuit reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion
based on Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause standards.109 After granting
Exxon’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court ultimately reduced the
punitive damage award to $507 million from its original $5 billion, con-
102. Simply relying on punitive damages to cover the cost of injuries missed by traditional
compensatory damages is unreliable and imprecise, conflating the purpose of various types of
damages. See Markel, supra note 99, at 1387 (suggesting that for clarity, punitive damages should
be broken into three kinds of extracompensatory damages, including retributive, deterrence, and
aggravated damages); id. at 1403 n.64 (discussing other scholars who have suggested disaggregat-
ing the multiple functions of punitive damages); see also Sharkey, supra note 85, at 356 (“There
are few givens when it comes to the centuries-old, highly controversial doctrine of punitive dam-
ages.”). Rather than force punitive damages to shoulder a number of varied purposes, the different
purposes of punitive damages should be carved out and addressed separately. Galligan, supra note
84, at 128 (“Disaggregation and separation will lead to clarity.”).
103. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).
104. Id. at 1246–47.
105. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
106. In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 611–12 (9th Cir. 2006).
107. Id.
108. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004).
109. In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d at 602.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 19 10-MAY-10 10:35
2009] ASSESSING ECOLOGICAL DAMAGES 113
cluding that the case could only support a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to
punitive damages.110
Fourteen years from verdict to resolution. Numerous appeals and re-
mands. Two intervening Supreme Court decisions on punitive damages. As
it happened, the jury’s punitive damage award in 1994 was not bound for
closure any time soon and the outcome of the award was surely unpredict-
able. Indeed, by the time the Supreme Court decided the Exxon case in
2008, 20 percent of the 32,000 plaintiffs were deceased. Punitive damages
were certainly not a predictable or reliable tool for ensuring total cost re-
covery and deterrence in the Exxon litigation.
C. Natural Resource Damages
On their face, natural resource damages appear to be the most promis-
ing candidate for redressing ecological harms. After all, the articulated pur-
pose of natural resource damages is the full assessment of natural resource
injuries such that these resources can be restored to the extent feasible.
However, natural resource damages are limited in several respects that
make them an underutilized tool in redressing environmental injuries.
First, federal natural resource damages are limited principally to re-
leases under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)111 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).112 This
means that natural resource damages are options only when there has been a
release of oil into navigable waters or a hazardous substance release into the
environment.113 In addition, under CERCLA and OPA, natural resource
damages may only be pursued by designated federal, state, or tribal trustees
who act on behalf of the public interest.114
110. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008).
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607–9675 (2009).
112. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761 (2009). OPA was enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. See William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural Resource Damage
Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 ALAS. L. REV. 135 (2005). The Clean Water Act (CWA)
also contains provisions providing for natural resource damages when oil and hazardous sub-
stances are released to navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2009).
113. CERCLA and OPA create liability for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A). The statutes similarly define natu-
ral resources as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and
other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States . . ., any State or local government or Indian tribe, or any foreign
government . . . ” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (2009). CERCLA creates
liability for the release of hazardous substances into the environment and OPA creates liability for
the discharge of oil into navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone of
deep ocean waters. Note also, that while CERCLA and OPA do not limit states from imposing
additional liability requirements or creating additional rights of action, state natural resource dam-
age programs vary widely in their effectiveness. If a uniform and reliable framework for re-
dressing ecological injuries is what we seek, successful state natural resource damage programs
could inform the issue but not resolve it.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). This means that private plaintiffs seek-
ing to recover damages for injuries caused by harm to the environment—e.g., the private land-
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-MAY-10 10:35
114 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:1
Even if federal natural resource damages were more widely available
in theory, natural resource damages have proven to be underutilized tools
for recovering ecological injuries because of the costs and controversy asso-
ciated with assessing and valuing natural resource injuries. This is the sec-
ond major limitation of natural resource damages. In order to support a
claim for natural resource damages, for instance, trustees typically prepare a
natural resource damage assessment. While not mandated by regulation, a
natural resource damages assessment is a key component of proving the
extent of damages to which trustees are entitled. To that end, CERCLA
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of damages assessed according to
regulatory procedures.115 Without that presumption, the trustees face the
unenviable task of proving that a particular person caused the harms identi-
fied in the natural resource damage claim and that the costs of those harms
are properly valued. As a practical matter, therefore, natural resource dam-
age assessments are indispensable for trustees seeking to avoid challenge
and costly litigation by potentially responsible parties.
Natural resource damage assessments, however, are costly proposi-
tions.116 In fact, the prospect of undertaking the cost of an assessment puts
pursuit of natural resource damages out of reach for some state and federal
trustees.117 While polluters are ultimately responsible for reimbursing the
trustees for the cost of the assessment for successful claims, the time and
expense for conducting such an assessment is more than the budgets of
many trustees can bear in the first instance.118
owners or commercial fishermen plaintiffs in the Exxon litigation—could not unilaterally avail
themselves of CERCLA or OPA’s natural resource damage provisions. Local governments and
private parties would have to resort to relief provided under state or common law, if any. 42
U.S.C. § 9652(d) (CERCLA does not modify remedies available under the common law).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(c).
116. New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1242 n.28 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the court is “well aware that NRD assessment is a costly proposition”). In New Mexico v. General
Electric, the Tenth Circuit went on to explain that “[a]ccording to two commentators, after its
1986 amendments, CERCLA ‘cast trustees adrift to finance their own damage assessment before
filing claims against polluters—a costly proposition, given that damage assessments typically cost
millions of dollars. This lack of funding has created a virtually insurmountable obstacle consider-
ing that agency budgets have historically authorized little or no funding for NRD assessments.’”
Id. (quoting Gina M. Lambert & Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA’s Natural Resource
Damages Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine Into Natural Resource Damage
Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 353, 371–72 (1992)).
117. Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: Failures, Lessons
Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REV. 409, 447–48 (2008) (“Natural resource trustees are
generally understaffed and underfunded.”).
118. Id. Some states, like New Jersey and California, have devised relatively successful natu-
ral resource damage programs because they have made funding available for damage assessments
up front. Id. at 438–44 (discussing New Jersey approach to natural resource damages). In addition,
these states have also been successful at reducing the cost of assessments by enacting regulations
that approve certain simplified methodologies. Id. Those simplified methodologies, however, are
nonetheless vulnerable to legal challenge absent any presumption in favor of the trustee if method-
ologies are followed. See id. at 445.
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As concluded by a federal advisory committee report released in 2007,
the federal natural resource damages process needs to be revised in order to
make restoration of natural resources “faster, more efficient, and more ef-
fective.”119 To that end, the advisory committee’s recommendations were
aimed, in part, at establishing cooperative relationships with potentially re-
sponsible parties in order to: (1) encourage responsible parties to fund dam-
age assessments in the first instance; and (2) avoid valuation issues by
encouraging responsible parties to conduct the restoration activities.120 Un-
til natural resource damage processes and methodologies can be revised to
facilitate effective recovery of public costs to natural resources, they will
most likely continue to be underutilized and met with success in only the
unusual case.
Where does the Exxon natural resource damages settlement fit into this
picture? In many ways, the Exxon settlement is an example of a best-case
scenario—a success story in the world of natural resource damages. First,
though the extent of the Exxon Valdez oil spill was unprecedented, the im-
pacts of oil on the marine environment are relatively well-studied when
compared to the release of hazardous substances and toxic cocktails that
typically define Superfund sites under CERCLA. As a result, in relative
119. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION FEDERAL ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE, FINAL REPORT 7 (2007), available at http://restoration.doi.gov/pdf/facamtg5finalreport.
pdf [hereinafter 2007 FAC Report]. See also Tolan, supra note 117 (arguing for revision of federal
natural resource damages program); James Peck, Comment, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues
in Evaluating and Litigating Natural Resources Damages, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 275
(1999) (arguing for revisions to natural resources damages regulations); Dale B. Thompson, Valu-
ing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resources Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57
(2002).
120. See 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 119. On this latter point, one of the most hotly con-
tested issues in natural resource damage claims is valuation. See, e.g., Allan Kanner and Tibor
Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 417, 448 (2005) (noting that “measuring natural resource damages is ‘the most daunt-
ing task facing trustees.’”) (citing Richard Stewart et al., Evaluating the Present Natural Resource
Damages Regime: The Lawyer’s Perspective, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECO-
NOMIC, AND POLICY ANALYSIS 163 (Richard Stewart ed., 1995); James L. Nicoll, Environmental
Restoration: Challenges for the New Millennium: The Irrationality of Economic Rationality in the
Restoration of Natural Resources, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 463, 464 (2000) (challenging traditional eco-
nomic theory in the valuation of natural resources); Thompson, supra note 119, at 60 (“Natural
resource damages present a significant challenge for the legal system because in most cases they
are non-market commodities,”). How do we effectively measure the loss of, or injury to, certain
resources? One approach is by measuring the use and existence value of the resource from a
utilitarian perspective, e.g., the worth of the resource measured by its value to individuals or
society. See Peck, supra note 120, at 279–82. Another approach—the biocentric approach—
would measure the intrinsic value of the resource independent of human satisfactions. Id. Not
surprisingly, the preferred method of valuing natural resources is to quantify utilitarian values of
use and existence through some method of cost-benefit analysis. Id. Three of the most common
methods for measuring the value of natural resource damages are market valuation, restoration
and replacement cost, and contingent valuation. Id. Regardless of the chosen method, however,
there are certain to be controversies given that natural resource damages are unique in many
instances and their uses not readily subject to valuation.
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terms, the trustees were in a better position to assess natural resource dam-
ages for the Exxon spill.121
Second, the natural resource trustees avoided litigation of their natural
resource damages claim by settling the claims with Exxon for $900 million,
to be paid over ten years.122 That settlement was signed in 1991, just two
years after the spill, allowing the damages recovered to be put to quick use
in restoring the Prince William Sound marine ecosystem and studying the
lingering impacts of the spill. Indeed, because of the controversies sur-
rounding natural resource assessment and valuation, the most successful
strategy for pursuing natural resource damage claims appears to be coopera-
tive arrangements with the potentially responsible parties and settlement.123
By contrast, in cases where natural resource damages are litigated, the
resolution can be many years in the making and the outcome not always
favorable to the trustees. For example, in 1999 the state of New Mexico
filed a claim for natural resource damages in federal district court in a case
involving the release of hazardous substances in groundwater.124 After three
years of motion practice, the case was scheduled for a pretrial conference in
2002.125 The district court reached a decision on the merits in 2004126 and
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a final decision in 2006.127 After
seven years of litigation, New Mexico walked away empty handed, unable
to prove its claim for damages.128
In addition to settlement, the Exxon case benefited from coordination
and agreement among trustees. In some cases, no such agreement is forth-
coming. For example,
121. See Tolan, supra note 117, at 425–26 (noting that “there are over 100,000 industrial
chemicals that are on the market today, presenting scientists with unprecedented challenges in
defining aggregate and cumulative impacts on the environment and her creatures”); id. at 426
(“unlike oil spills under OPA and point source discharges under the Clean Water Act, other types
of discharges are more challenging to assess.”). That said, it is important to remember that the
ability to predict long-term impacts of oil spills may be better than the ability to predict injuries
resulting from some hazardous substance releases, but that does not mean our ability to predict the
impacts of Exxon were perfect, or even good. See Rodgers, supra note 112, at 153 (quoting Na-
tional Research Council study from 2003 that concluded “[o]ne of the more profound outcomes of
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill was the recognition of our limited ability to realistically predict
the effects of an oil spill on marine resources”).
122. Agreement and Consent Decree, para. 6, 8, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A-91-081
(D. Alaska Oct. 9, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Consent Decree].
123. Tolan, supra note 117, at 447–49 (describing the benefits of cooperative relationships
verses litigation); see also 2007 FAC REPORT, supra note 119, at 10 (describing cooperation as
providing a “great potential to leverage success and result in more effective, efficient, and sustain-
able natural resources restoration and protection.”).
124. For an in-depth, case-study discussion regarding the New Mexico litigation, see Tolan,
supra note 117, at 426.
125. Id.
126. See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Gen. Elec. I), 335 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.N.M. 2003);
New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Gen. Elec. II), 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1231 (D.N.M. 2004).
127. New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Gen. Elec. III), 467 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006).
128. Id.
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[a]fter the lower Fox River had been contaminated by
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from local paper companies,
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) settled
the case for seven million dollars at a time when the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) estimated natural resource damages to be
between $176 million and $333 million.129
In the Fox River case, the state and federal trustees did not even agree
on the scope of the damage itself.
Finally, the federal and state trustees successfully negotiated for the
inclusion of a reopener provision in the settlement agreement. That re-
opener provision allowed the trustees to seek an additional $100 million for
restoration projects in Prince William Sound and other areas affected by the
oil spill.130 The provision set a window for claiming additional damages—
September 1, 2002 to September 1, 2006.131 In addition, the trustees were
required to show that the injury for which they claimed additional damages
“could not reasonably have been known nor could it reasonably have been
anticipated” by any trustee as of the date of the 1991 settlement.132 By
including the reopener provision, trustees were able to address some of the
inherent difficulties in valuing ecological injuries—namely the uncertainty
pertaining to long-term impacts.
Even though the Exxon natural resource damages settlement might be
deemed a success story on the whole, it nonetheless highlights the limita-
tions in the ability to capture all costs. First, though oil spills are relatively
well-studied when compared to CERCLA’s toxic slurries, the long-term im-
pacts of the spill were, and to some extent still are, unpredictable.133 Indeed,
at the time of the settlement in 1991, much was unknown about the impacts
of the Exxon oil spill. “The 1991 settlement was thus approved despite a
measure of ignorance.”134
Second, settlement is not always the mark of a successful natural re-
source damage claim resolution. To that end, if settlement is being pursued
by the federal or state trustees because a trustee-funded natural resource
damages assessment is prohibitively expensive and the notion of natural
resource damages litigation too costly and protracted, the liable party gains
leverage in the settlement negotiations. In other words, the liable party
would appear to be in the position of power, despite facing sizeable natural
resource damages, because the trustee may need the responsible party to
cooperate in order to effectively pursue natural resource damages at all. In
129. Tolan, supra note 117, at 431–32.
130. 1991 Consent Decree para. 17.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra Section I for a discussion of unknown impacts to Pacific herring. See also
supra notes 8 and 62 for a description of long-term impacts.
134. See Rodgers, supra note 112, at 153; see also supra note 8, for a discussion of scientists’
evolving understanding of impacts from the Exxon oil spill.
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those situations, the amount of natural resource damages ultimately negoti-
ated may be well below the actual cost of the injuries imposed by the liable
party on the environment.135
Third, though the $900 million natural resource damage claim was
considered a record natural resource damage settlement at the time,136 those
funds have not ensured the full restoration of the Prince William Sound
ecosystem. In June 2006, the federal and state trustees requested an addi-
tional $92 million under the reopener provision to fund restoration projects
based on the continued presence of oil in the habitats of Prince William
Sound beaches.137
Despite the promise of the reopener provision for capturing adverse
impacts unknown at the time of settlement, it is still unclear whether the
reopener provision will achieve its intended purpose. Notably, this was the
first time that the U.S. Department of Justice had ever submitted a demand
under a reopener provision.138 Moreover, the reopener demand does not
request funds in connection with the long-term damage to the herring fish-
ery.139 Of course, such funding was not part of the original settlement
award given that the collapse of the fishery had not even occurred at that
time. In addition, whether the reopener will achieve its intended purpose is
still unclear. Despite a wealth of science to the contrary, Exxon appears to
contest the fact that there is lingering oil in Prince William Sound. Exxon’s
investigation appears to be ongoing.140 So even though the trustees success-
fully negotiated the inclusion of a reopener provision, it remains to be seen
whether Exxon will be held accountable for the lingering impacts of the
spill. This again illustrates that there are bound to be controversies stem-
ming from the identification and valuation of ecological injuries despite the
best laid plans.
135. Given that contingent valuation studies done on the damage to Prince William Sound
ranged from $3 billion to $15 billion, see Rodgers, supra note 112, at 149, it is possible that the
$900 million settlement underestimated the value of the damages. On the other hand, at the time
that the trustees were negotiating the Exxon natural resource damage settlement, “there were no
functional rules for calculating [natural resource damages]” and “no one, not even federal liti-
gators, had confidence in the [$3 billion to $15 billion] estimates.” Id. at 149. “The lack of a
complete, accurate damages valuation suggests the political nature of the settlement.” Id. at 153.
136. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Exxon to Pay Record One Billion Dollars in Criminal
Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil Spill (Mar. 13, 1991).
137. See Joint Press Release, Dep’t of Justice and State of Alaska Dep’t of Law, United States
and the State of Alaska Seeking Additional Funds from ExxonMobil for Continuing Natural Re-
source Damages Caused By 1989 Oil Spill (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.
us/Files.cfm?doc=/Store/Event_Documents/SAK-DOI_PressRelease.pdf&.
138. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERIVCE, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL – CIVIL SETTLEMENT
“REOPENER” 2 (2006), http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0025800.pdf.
139. See Comprehensive Plan for Habitat Restoration Projects Pursuant to Reopener for Un-
known Injury, http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/oil/.
140. The Alaska Department of Law’s Environmental Section notes on its website that the
reopener demand letter was submitted on August 31, 2006 and that “the governments continue to
pursue this matter.” See About Alaska’s Department of Law’s Environmental Section, http://
www.law.state.ak.us/department/civil/enviro.html#exxon.
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The Exxon natural resource damages settlement, therefore, highlights
that under other scenarios—where a slurry of hazardous substances are at
issue, where no successful settlement is reached, or where there is little
cooperation between federal and state trustees—natural resource damages
would not necessarily be an effective means of recovering costs in a timely
and reliable manner. Under these less than ideal circumstances, the identifi-
cation and valuation issues that plague all ecological injuries would be even
less likely to be redressed by natural resource damages.
All this is to demonstrate that natural resource damages are not a
ready-made solution to redressing ecological harms. Though their theoreti-
cal purpose might come closest to capturing the total cost of ecological
injury, these damages do not provide a widely accessible or applicable
method for assessing and recovering the costs of environmental injury. In-
deed, natural resource damages suffer from some of the same fundamental
problems as compensatory damages—there is inherent difficulty and uncer-
tainty in identifying and valuing ecological harms. Rather than natural re-
source damages being a ready-made tool for ensuring full cost recovery for
ecological harms, it is worth considering whether the natural resource dam-
ages framework might benefit from some of the proposals in this article to
aid with more efficient identification and valuation of harm, and encourage-
ment of settlements to avoid lengthy and costly litigation. That issue is, of
course, for another day.
SECTION III – INVOKING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES TO FIND A
WORKABLE SOLUTION
I submit that the failure to pinpoint the precise ecological pathways
through which the Exxon oil spill impacted the herring fishery is not a fail-
ure of science. I further submit that the failure to redress this injury through
the Exxon Valdez litigation or natural resource damage assessment process
is not a failure of advocacy. Rather, I propose that the nature of the ecologi-
cal injuries makes it very difficult in cases like this to identify the extent
and duration of the harm within our existing legal framework. As illustrated
by the Exxon case, our current legal tools for compensating ecological
harms are insufficient at: (1) identifying the ecological harm over a mean-
ingful timeframe; and (2) valuing those harms to reflect their unique, public
nature.
In light of these difficulties, I propose that we consider a special dam-
ages paradigm for addressing ecological injuries. In particular, I propose
that we invoke the precautionary principle to shift the risk wrapped up in
the uncertain, complex, and irreversible nature of ecological injuries.
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A. Background on Precautionary Principle
In its traditional application, the precautionary principle encourages
government entities to adopt cost-effective measures to control environ-
mental risks even in the face of scientific uncertainty.141 Some argue that
the spirit of the precautionary principle has been acted upon for many de-
cades, if not centuries.142 Articulation of the precautionary principle as
such, however, did not emerge until the late in the twentieth century in
Germany. To that end, the principle is thought to have its roots in the Ger-
man concept of Vorsorgeprinzip, loosely translated as “foresightplan-
ning.”143 As explained by the German Federal Interior Ministry in 1984,
“[t]he principle of precaution commands that the damages done to the natu-
ral world (which surrounds us all) should be avoided in advance and in
accordance with opportunity and possibility. . . . [I]t also means acting
when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet
available.”144
Since its emergence, this principle has been expressly endorsed by the
EU as part of its regulatory directives. Indeed, the 1997 Treaty establishing
the EU declared that its environmental policy “shall be based on the precau-
tionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source
and that the polluter should pay.”145 In February 2000, the European Com-
mission issued a communication detailing how the principle should be ap-
plied in the EU’s environmental policy decisions.146 In the course of its
analysis, the Commission concludes that the principle has “become a full-
fledged and general principle of international law.”147 One example of the
principle’s application is in the burden of proof required by some EU rules.
The Commission explains that for some products like drugs, pesticides, or
food additives, regulations make the producer or manufacturer responsible
141. See Dana, supra note 19, at 1315–16.
142. Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 21, 23 (2006) (providing history of precautionary principle and noting that “some have
argued that the precautionary principle is thousands of years old because millennial oral traditions
of indigenous people contain the concept of precaution.”); see also ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING,
supra note 35, at 17–20 (describing the principle and arguing for its broader adoption in the
adoption of U.S. environmental laws).
143. Percival, supra note 142, at 23–24.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 26 (citing Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts—Consolidated Ver-
sion of the Treaty Establishing the European Union, art. 174(2), 1997 O.J. (C 340)).
146. Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle 1 (Feb. 2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/li-
brary/pub/pub07_en.pdf.
147. Id. at 21.
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for proving that the substance is not hazardous before it can be placed on
the market.148
The most public international display of support for the principle oc-
curred at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.149 The Rio Declaration,
adopted by the United National Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment during the Summit, states that: “In order to protect the environment,
the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”150 The Rio
Declaration was signed by representatives of 178 nations, including the first
President Bush. This statement of the precautionary principle has also been
embraced in subsequent international agreements.151
A similarly descriptive explanation of the precautionary principle was
offered in a consensus statement by a group of environmental scientists:
Scientific studies can tell us something about the costs, risks, and
benefits of the proposed action, but there will always be value
judgments that require political decisions. . . . Although there are
some situations in which risks clearly exceed benefits no matter
whose values are being considered, there is usually a large gray
area in which science alone cannot (and should not) be used to
decide policy. . . . When there is substantial scientific uncertainty
about the risks and benefits of a proposed activity, policy deci-
sions should be made in a way that errs on the side of caution
with respect to the environment and the health of the public.152
The precautionary principle, at its root, openly acknowledges the sci-
entific uncertainty that is inherent in predictions of environmental impacts.
No scientist can say with complete confidence that certain consequences
will or will not flow from the many footprints humans leave in the sands of
the Earth. Rather than use that uncertainty as an excuse to do nothing, how-
ever, the precautionary principle provides a value-based reason for pursuing
sensible actions despite uncertainty.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Percival, supra note 142, at 25 (quoting U.N. Conference on Environment & Develop-
ment (UNCED), June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle
15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
151. Percival, supra note 142, at 25.
152. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 35, at 118 (citing David Kriebel et al., The Pre-
cautionary Principle in Environmental Science, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., Sept. 2001, at 873, 875).
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B. Principle in Action in U.S. Environmental Law
Looking to the precautionary principle for guidance in redressing eco-
logical injuries is not a radical notion. The United States already incorpo-
rates the spirit of this principle into many aspects of environmental law.153
The Clean Air Act, for example, requires the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards to protect the
public health with an adequate margin of safety.154 The Clean Air Act also
requires the EPA to regulate fuel additives that “may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger the public health or welfare.”155 This is different from the
Act’s original language that required regulation only for additives that “will
endanger the public health or welfare.”156 Congress amended the language
after lead-additive manufacturers challenged the EPA’s decision to control
lead-additives in gasoline. Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s decision despite the “will en-
danger” language of the Act.157 In a landmark decision, the court
recognized the precautionary nature of the Clean Air Act and concluded
that “[r]egulatory action may be taken before the threatened harm occurs;
indeed the very existence of . . . precautionary legislation would seem to
demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the per-
ceived threat.”158
In a similarly precautionary spirit, the Clean Water Act (CWA) re-
quires states to identify all water bodies that fail to meet water quality stan-
dards despite effluent limitations contained in permits. For these identified
water bodies, states must determine the total maximum daily load of pollu-
tants that would allow attainment of water quality standards. In setting this
153. “[E]ven without expressly embracing the precautionary principle, U.S. environmental
law has developed in a manner quite consistent with many elements of it. . . .” Percival, supra note
142, at 36; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1005–07 (2003) (explaining that “[i]n the United States, without using the term explicitly, Con-
gress has built a notion of precaution into some important statutes, allowing or requiring regula-
tion on the basis of conservation assumptions.”); see also Lazarus, supra note 20, at 23 (noting
that the irreversible nature of much ecological injury drives environmental law to reflect a precau-
tionary principle and to focus, accordingly, on preventing the realization of environmental risks
rather than the redressing of environmental harms).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2002).
155. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 401(e), 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A)).
156. Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, § 211(c)(1)(A), 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A)).
157. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
158. Id. at 13. For a detailed description of the history of events underlying the lead-additive
controversy, see Percival, supra note 142, at 57–63. Percival also provides other excellent exam-
ples of how the precautionary principle is embedded in U.S. environmental lawmaking. See also
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 35, at 4 (describing the leaded gasoline controversy and
calling the D.C. Circuit decision “a landmark” “because it established that EPA could act in a
precautionary fashion rather than wait for scientific certainty about the harmfulness of a substance
before acting.”).
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 29 10-MAY-10 10:35
2009] ASSESSING ECOLOGICAL DAMAGES 123
maximum load, the CWA requires the states to include “a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality.”159
Also, the environmental review process set forth in the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA)160 is based on the premise that federal agen-
cies should look before they leap. NEPA requires federal agencies to
prepare detailed environmental impact statements assessing potential im-
pacts of major actions.161 Agencies must consider the alternatives to their
proposed actions.162 And while NEPA does not dictate the outcome of
agency decision making,163 the precautionary principle is inherent in the
idea that agencies carefully consider the consequences of their actions
before making “any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources.”164
There are other times in the history of U.S. environmental lawmaking
that protective measures have been adopted before the scientific evidence of
harm could be fully formulated. The U.S. regulatory policy to phase out
chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) is a good example. The EPA promulgated regu-
lations in 1978 to limit the use of CFCs in nonessential aerosol propellants.
At the time, scientific research confirmed that CFCs could in theory be
damaging the ozone layer, but there was still no definitive proof. The
EPA’s response came nearly a decade before the international community
would sign the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer.165
To be fair, the precautionary principle has its critics, usually from eco-
nomics and law scholars advocating a cost-benefit analysis.166 For example,
159. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4347 (2006).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). Notably, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency de-
scribes NEPA as inserting environmental values into its decision-making: “[NEPA] federal agen-
cies to integrate environmental values into their decision making processes by considering the
environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions.” See
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental Policy Act (2009), http://
www.epa.gov/Compliance/nepa/index.html.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (2006).
163. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) (“NEPA
merely prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) (2006); see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that “agencies must prepare NEPA documents, such as EA or EIS, before any
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources”).
165. The Montreal Protocol called for a freeze on the consumption and production of CFCs at
1986 levels and a 50 percent reduction in CFC use by industrialized countries over a ten-year
period. See Percival, supra note 142, at 63 (citing RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLO-
MACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 87 (1991)).
166. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 153, at 1020–22 (arguing that the precautionary principle
is “paralyzing” because it offers no real guidance on when activities should be regulated and to
what degree). But see Dana, supra note 19, at 1330–32 (critiquing critics of the precautionary
principle and making the affirmative case for its usefulness in mitigating cognitive biases in deci-
sionmaking); Percival, supra note 142, at 27–29 (discussing criticisms of precautionary principle).
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Professor Cass Sunstein criticizes the precautionary principle for being
“paralyzing” and “unhelpful.”167 Sunstein explains that the precautionary
principle often appears to call for more stringent regulation in the face of
uncertainty.168 But more stringent regulations, he argues, will in some cases
eliminate “opportunity benefits” or carry other “substitute risks.”169 For in-
stance, setting a fifty parts per billion standard for arsenic in drinking water
could result in over one hundred deaths per year in the worst case scena-
rio.170 While the precautionary principle would counsel for more stringent
regulation, Sunstein explains that a ten parts per billion standard would
“cost over two hundred million dollars each year” and “save as few as five
lives annually.”171 The cost of the arsenic regulation could lead people to
switch to private wells, which have high levels of contamination.172 Sun-
stein uses this example (and others) to conclude that the precautionary prin-
ciple does not provide ready guidance to whether more stringent regulation
is appropriate because more stringent regulation is not without its own
costs.173
The criticisms leveled by Sunstein, even if accepted at face value, do
not resonate when the precautionary principle is invoked in the manner sug-
gested here. This article suggests using the precautionary principle in the
context of assessing ecological damages, to transfer costs associated with
the uncertainties of ecological harm unto the party responsible for that
harm. While there may be substitute risks or missed opportunities caused by
shifting costs to the liable party, asking the liable party to bear the cost of
those risks or missed opportunities is not the same as balancing between
one set of costs to public health and another (as described in Sunstein’s
arsenic example above). Instead, invoking the precautionary principle here
is a conscious decision that requiring liable parties to bear the risks associ-
ated with ecological harm is preferable to asking the injured party, society,
or the environment to do so. Scholars critical of the trend toward narrow
economic analysis of health and environmental protection, such as econo-
mist Frank Ackerman and law professor Lisa Heinzerling, have explained:
When the question is to allow one person to hurt another, or de-
stroy a natural resource; when a life or landscape cannot be re-
placed; when harms stretch out over decades or generations; when
outcomes are uncertain; when risks are shared or resources are
used in common; when people ‘buying’ harms have no relation-
ship with the people actually harmed—then we are in the realm of
167. Sunstein, supra note 153, at 1004, 1008.
168. Id. at 1022–23.
169. Id. at 1023–25.
170. Id. at 1020–21.
171. Id. at 1021.
172. Id. at 1025.
173. Sunstein, supra note 153, at 1025.
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the priceless, where market values tell us little about the social
values at stake.174
Ackerman and Heinzerling, therefore, “urge precaution in the face of
scientific uncertainty.”175 Even Sunstein recognizes that “for risks for
which there are no satisfactory basis for balancing costs and benefits, such
as catastrophic risks or risks of species extinction, something akin to the
precautionary principle makes good sense.”176 The case of requiring liable
parties to bear the cost of uncertainties associated with ecological damages,
as suggested below, appears to be a situation where there is no satisfactory
basis for balancing costs and benefits, or elevating private gain over public
interest.
C. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Damages for Ecological
Injuries
Often the irreversible nature of the ecological injuries drives the adop-
tion of a precautionary approach to prevent the risk of harms in the first
instance.177 While our environmental laws seem to invoke the spirit of the
precautionary principle at the front-end of environmental regulation, we do
not seek guidance from this principle at the back-end—namely when harm
has occurred and we are determining the proper redress. Rather, as illus-
trated by the Exxon case, our existing damages paradigm has difficulty ac-
counting for the uncertainty and complexity of ecological injuries.
That is why I propose using the precautionary principle to develop a
burden-shifting framework, whereby in the face of uncertainty concerning
the extent and duration of ecological injuries, the liable party bears the costs
and risks that accompany that uncertainty. Though in its traditional applica-
tion the precautionary principle operates to encourage regulation despite un-
certainties, this proposal would draw on the aspect of the principle that
shifts the burden of proof to the liable party, similar to the EU regulations
described earlier.
More specifically, I propose that a defendant determined to be liable
for environmental injuries is offered two options for damages. As a first
option, the defendant may choose to accept a multiplier for compensatory
damages to account for the uncertainty of the harm caused. As a second
option, the defendant may choose to pay damages as they are assessed on
an ongoing basis into the future.178 I will consider the benefits and draw-
backs for each of these options in turn.
174. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 35, at 8–9.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Percival, supra note 142, at 58 (citing Sunstein, supra note 153, at 16).
177. See LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 23.
178. The reason for allowing defendants to choose one option or the other is to avoid issues of
finality and judicial economy by forcing the defendant to pay for damages on an ongoing basis
into the future. Such finality concerns often arise in the context of criminal law. See Daniel S.
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The purpose of the multiplier is to address the difficulties in identify-
ing the full extent of ecological harm that may have been caused by the
defendant’s conduct. Due to their uncertain and complex nature, there is a
high likelihood that ecological injuries are more extensive than initial inves-
tigation will reveal. The multiplier mitigates identification issues by work-
ing a margin of safety into the compensatory scheme. The benefit of the
multiplier is that it gives defendants an opportunity for relatively quick res-
olution. The tradeoff is its admittedly rough-cut nature. In other words, the
aim of the multiplier is to offset some of the inherent uncertainties in valu-
ing ecological harm, but the result is not necessarily a precise measure of
the total cost. By imposing a multiplier, however, the defendant is forced to
internalize the uncertainties of its actions by operating within a damages
framework that accounts for some of the unique qualities of ecological
harm.179
The multiplier concept is not a new one. Compensatory damage multi-
pliers are, for example, authorized in the area of antitrust law. Federal anti-
trust and RICO statutes provide for treble damages.180 “Theoretically, treble
damages may be justified on the basis that all wrongs of the relevant type
will not be detected and prosecuted; therefore, trebling awards will provide
a more realistic measure of all the damages that the wrongdoer has caused
and will force that wrongdoer to pay (or face) them.”181 Some law scholars
have argued for a multiplier approach in punitive damages in order to facili-
tate optimal deterrence.182 While deterrence would not necessarily be the
Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA
Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 691 (2005) (“Among the benefits of finality
offered by backers of time limits are gaining peace of mind, avoiding disturbing settled expecta-
tions, and reducing uncertainty and costs associated with uncertainty.”); see also id. at 688, n.221
(“noting that the Supreme Court has consistently proclaimed that ‘finality is essential to both the
retributive and deterrence functions of the criminal law and to the interests of victims of crimes in
obtaining closure’” (citing Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Fac-
tual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 606 (2002))).
179. For a detailed discussion of the benefits of augmented awards, see Galligan, supra note
84, at 129 (Galligan explains that “[t]he gist of Augmented Awards was that actual recoveries in
tort suits, for example, for any number of reasons, might not accurately or adequately represent
the actual value of the injuries or losses caused by the behavior . . . . According to the hypothesis
in Augmented Awards, in any case where the compensatory damages awarded (plus other applica-
ble sanctions or costs) are less than the full accident costs of the activity, an augmented award to
those who recover might lead to optimal deterrence and efficient behavior.”).
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
181. Galligan, supra note 84, at 121.
182. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 897–98 (“If a defendant can sometimes escape
liability for the harm for which he is responsible, the proper magnitude of damages is harm the
defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the probability of his escaping liability.”);
see also Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(“Such a [multiplier] conception of punitive damages, again, is not new, and it has been recog-
nized by courts as well as scholars.”); Sharkey, supra note 85, at 372 n.71 (collecting cases in
which courts have expressed approval for a multiplier approach in punitive damages); see also
Anthony Sebok, Deterrence or Disgorgement?: Reading Ciraolo After Campbell, 64 MD. L. REV.
541 (2005) (discussing other areas where multipliers have been proposed). But see Sharkey, supra
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driving factor in implementing a multiplier for costs of ecological injuries,
increasing the likelihood that liable parties would internalize the full cost of
those injuries would nonetheless have that effect.
Because a multiplier provides a simple, if crude, basis for assessing
compensatory damages for ecological injuries, a defendant might prefer to
assess and value the ecological injuries on an ongoing basis in order to
avoid possible overcompensation. The benefit of providing this second op-
tion is that it gives defendants some control over their own fate, lessening
their ability to argue that the multiplier treats them unfairly or forces over-
compensation. If a defendant believes that the extent of ecological injuries
caused by its actions were fairly and fully identified at the time of trial, the
defendant is free to stand by that belief and agree to pay for additional
harms that might manifest later.
The benefit of this option to plaintiffs is that it allows time for the full
extent of ecological injuries to manifest. In the case of Exxon, for example,
the collapse of the Pacific herring fishery did not even occur until after the
compensatory and punitive damages were determined at trial. Whether the
complete panoply of injuries would become apparent and therefore com-
pensated would depend on the length of time that defendants were required
to pay for damages. For Exxon, for example, scientists continue to discover
lingering impacts of the spill even twenty years after its occurrence.183 One
obvious question that would have to be resolved, therefore, is: how long is
long enough for requiring ongoing assessment and payment for injuries?
In practice, this option would obviously require a greater level of third-
party management and oversight than a simple multiplier. Such oversight
could be accomplished by assigning a special master to the case. In order to
ensure that a defendant does not become insolvent, a defendant might be
required to place some multiple of compensatory damages in escrow at the
time that liability was determined. The special master could then approve
expenditures from this case-specific “superfund” as future damages are es-
tablished by the plaintiff.
The drawback of offering defendants the option to pay into the future
would be the costs of oversight, and the potential for ongoing litigation
regarding the scope of damages caused by the defendant. In other words,
while this option would in theory result in damages that are more likely to
reflect actual cost of harm, the nature of ecological injuries is such that
note 85, at 369–70 (suggesting that the Supreme Court in State Farm v. Campbell “cast doubt
upon use of a strict punitive damages multiplier”).
183. Using data from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, social scientists Steven Picou, Brent Mar-
shall, and Duane Gill concluded that “litigation serves as a source of chronic stress for victims of
human caused disasters involved in court deliberations for damages.” Steven J. Picou, Brent K.
Marshall, and Duane A. Gill, Disaster, Litigation, and the Corrosive Community, SOCIAL FORCES,
June 2004, at 1493–1522. This research raises the question of whether offering defendants an
option to pay damages into the future on an ongoing basis would actually cause plaintiffs to suffer
greater harm.
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establishing harm becomes more difficult as more time has elapsed and
delay would provide a defendant the opportunity to avoid payment through
battle-of-the-expert challenges.
Under either option, some criteria for determining when this special
damages framework should apply would have to be developed. Rather than
tie these damages to reprehensibility as in the punitive context, I propose
returning to the characteristics that Richard Lazarus proposes make ecologi-
cal injuries unique in the first place. In particular, in the spirit of the precau-
tionary principle, I propose that this special damages framework should be
the default unless the defendant can show that the traditional characteristics
of ecological injuries do not apply. To that end, the framework would not
apply if the defendant could show that (1) the injury is one whose extent
and duration is accompanied by a high level of predictability, (2) the injury
is not irreversible (i.e. there are proven techniques for treatment or restora-
tion), and (3) there is an insignificant amount of controversy over the un-
derlying science.
It is also worth considering whether different categories of environ-
mental harm could benefit from different multipliers to accommodate the
uncertainty, complexity, hazards, and irreversibility. Through the use of
several different multipliers, loosely tailored to various activities, the dam-
ages regime would create varying levels of deterrence or risk-changing be-
havior for activities that create more significant hazards.
In the end, the multiplier option and the option of paying damages on
an ongoing basis have advantages and disadvantages. Of course, the devil is
in the details in terms of setting particular multipliers, negotiating the dura-
tion of a future payment arrangement, and developing a set of criteria for
determining when such a special damages framework should apply. The
first step to achieving a system that properly compensates for ecological
injuries, however, is to recognize the uniqueness of those injuries, accept
that there will be imperfections in the identification and valuation of harm,
and make a commitment to shifting the burden of uncertainty on the de-
fendants whose actions, regardless of motive, put the environment and pub-
lic resources at risk.
IV. CONCLUSION – MAKING A VALUE JUDGMENT
In the end, the types of special damages that I suggest in this article
respond to the uniqueness of ecological injuries. By invoking the precau-
tionary principle—namely by incorporating a margin of safety into the
compensation and by placing the burden on defendants to show the frame-
work should not apply—I fully acknowledge that society would be making
a value judgment. By that I mean that the nature of ecological harms is such
that society will rarely, if ever, be able to completely and fairly value those
harms. Our system will almost always end up under-compensating or over-
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compensating. Given the choice, I argue that the public and often irreversi-
ble nature of these harms require that the system errs on the side of over-
compensation.184 This is the value judgment. Given the choice of placing
the risk of uncertain injuries on the defendant or plaintiff, the precautionary
principle provides a guide to putting the risk and the ensuing costs on the
defendant, the actor in the best position to manage inevitable risks and
avoid unnecessary ones.
184. See also Sharkey, supra note 85, at 442–43 (discussing the concept of societal compensa-
tory damages in the context of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and noting that it would be useful for
certain types of torts to ask why “our greater concern is with underdeterrence rather than
overdeterrence”).
